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In the United States of America, appellate courts must 
balance efficiency with justice when dealing with criminal 
cases.  In order to make the system more efficient, certain 
procedural constraints have been put into place.  For instance, 
in a criminal appeal in many American jurisdictions, an 
appellate court is often limited to considering issues properly 
raised before that court by a rule referred to as the 
“preservation doctrine.”2  This doctrine is a source of tension for 
American appellate courts in dealing with criminal cases 
because it has the potential to conflict with their ability to 
achieve justice.3 
In New York, intermediate appellate courts are permitted 
to review factual issues in criminal cases.4  However, the Court 
of Appeals, which is New York’s highest court, is not permitted 
to do so.5  The Court of Appeals is restricted, to a great extent, 
to decide only legal issues properly raised at trial.6  In other 
words, the Court of Appeals can review, for the most part, only 
legal claims that were properly preserved at trial.7  As this 
 
1.  Yuval Simchi-Levi is an Assistant District Attorney in the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office.  The views expressed in this article are his 
own.  The author wishes to thank Craig Ascher, David M. Cohn, and Timothy 
C. Stone for their valuable comments and insight.  
2.  Richard J. Montes & David A. Beatty, The Preservation Rule in the 
New York Court of Appeals: How Recent Decisions and Characterizations of 
the Rule Inform Advocacy, 78 ALB. L. REV. 119, 120-22 (2015). 
3.  Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive 
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1263 
(2002).  
4.  N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., THE NEW YORK STATE COURTS: AN 
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE, http://nycourts.gov/reports/ctstrct99.pdf.  
5.  About the Court, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/aboutthecourt.shtml (last visited Nov. 
28, 2016). 
6.  Id. 
7. Appealability and Reviewability, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., 
1
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paper will demonstrate, over the past few years, the Court of 
Appeals has broadened its interpretation of the preservation 
doctrine at the cost of efficiently reviewing cases. 
The tension that the New York Court of Appeals faces as a 
court of law is emblematic of a challenge that many appellate 
courts face in the United States.  Courts have to grapple with 
the following questions: Should an appellate court be restricted 
by technical rules from examining a legal issue that could lead 
to the right result for the sake of efficiency?  Likewise, should a 
person suffer due to his trial attorney’s failure to interpose 
arguments at trial?  The American appellate system has 
struggled with how best to deal with these questions. 
How a state’s criminal justice system deals with these 
issues matters.  For instance, as has been well-documented, the 
New York City criminal courts are struggling to deal with a 
backlog of criminal cases due to pre-trial delays.8  
Consequently, many individuals are “languishing” in prison as 
they await an ultimate disposition in their cases.9  As this 
paper will show, how the New York Court of Appeals deals 
with procedural constraints on its scope of review similarly has 
a direct impact on the backlog of criminal cases awaiting 
review by that court. 
The Article proceeds as follows: in Part A, the preservation 
doctrine is defined.  In Part B, the history of the preservation 
doctrine is described.  In Part C, there is an explanation as to 
the purpose of preservation.  In Part D, there is a description of 
the appellate process in New York.  In Part E, the statutory 
rules of the New York Court of Appeals are described.  In Part 
F, there is a description of how the rules of preservation have 
loosened in New York since 2009.  In Part G, there is a 
statistical analysis of the consequences of loosening the rules of 
 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/forms/civil5_05.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 
2016). 
8.  William Glaberson, Even for Minor Crimes in Bronx, No Guarantee of 
Getting a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1; William Glaberson, For 3 
Years After Killing, Evidence Fades as a Suspect Sits in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2013, at A1; William Glaberson, Courts in Slow Motion, Aided by the 
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, at A1; William Glaberson, Waiting Years 
for Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at A1.  
9.  Michael Sfchwirtz & Michael Winerip, Push to Reduce Total at Rikers 
Aims at Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2015, at A1.   
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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preservation in New York.  Finally, Part H shows how 
loosening the rules of preservation impacts the efficiency of 
appellate courts. 
 
I. What is the Preservation Doctrine? 
To preserve a claim for appellate review, three general 
prerequisites must be satisfied.10  First, there must actually be 
a specific ruling made by a trial judge.11  Second, a party must 
have suggested to the trial judge that the ruling was wrong.12  
Third, if the trial court did not correct its ruling, the aggrieved 
party can appeal the ruling to an appellate court.13  In other 
words, in order for an attorney to argue on appeal that the 
judge erred during the trial, the attorney must object to the 
court’s decision at trial and state why the attorney disagrees 
with the judge’s ruling. 
 
II. Historical Analysis of Preservation 
The tension in American appellate law as to whether 
appellate courts should be constrained to review certain 
developed issues or should adopt a more flexible notion of 
appeal is a byproduct of having adopted the American legal 
system from England, where there were courts of law and 
equity with their own separate appellate processes.14  During 
the Roman Empire, parties could re-litigate claims with new 
evidence.15  In England, by the end of the twelfth century, the 
appeal would go from a local court, to a court of the 
archbishops, “and then to the courts of the Pope.”16  However, 
because in this appellate system there were few procedural 
requirements, there was an “almost unlimited right of appeal 
 
10.  Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S 523 (1983). 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id.; see Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The 
General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (1987). 
14.  Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 913, 915 (1997). 
15.  Id. at 928. 
16.  Id. at 929.  See generally MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND 
MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570-1640, 35-37 (1987).   
3
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to the Pope.”17 
The American understanding of appellate law evolved from 
the eighteenth century English common law.  The notion of 
preservation specifically developed from the English writ of 
error model, which governed criminal proceedings.18  Under 
that legal system, a trial judge’s authority was limited to 
questions of law, while the jury served as the fact-finder.19  To 
appeal a judgment, a writ of error was required, in which the 
party appealing the judgment alleged that the trial judge made 
an error.20 
Preservation of legal issues was significant under the writ 
of error.21  The only way to determine if a trial judge had made 
an error was to review the record, which consisted “only of 
formal documents filed in court and the official record of the 
actions of the jury and the judge.”22 And, because what 
occurred at trial could not be recorded verbatim, a procedure — 
the bill of exceptions — developed, where a party who 
disagreed with a court’s ruling could challenge it and request 
that a third party record, in writing, the judge’s ruling and the 
aggrieved party’s exception to the ruling.23  That written record 
would then be sent to the appellate court as part of the 
appeal.24 
At the same time, in England, there were courts of equity 
where judges would dispense justice as they saw appropriate 
based on the facts of the cases before them.25  An appellate 
 
17.  Bilder, supra note 14, at 929 (quoting 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-14 (7th ed. 1956)). 
18.  Sean Arthurs, Comment and Casenote, A Foolish Consistency: How 
Refusing to Review Ford v. Garcia’s Invited Error Demonstrates the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Prioritization of Procedure Over Justice, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1707, 
1710 (2004); Nora Meltzer, Note, Dismissing the Foster Children, The Eleven 
Circuit’s Misapplication and Improper Expansion of The Younger Abstention 
Doctrine in Bonnie L. v. Bush, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 635, 642 (2004).  See also 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). 
19.  Arthurs, supra note 18, at 1710-11. 
20.  Martineau, supra note 13, at 1026. 
21.  Id. at 1026-27; see generally ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
IN CIVIL CASES 38-71 (1941). 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Miller, supra note 3, at 1263. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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court in equity could consider any issue on appeal regardless of 
whether it was preserved or not.26  As a result, the appellate 
court reviewed the entire case regardless of whether an issue 
had previously been raised to the trial court.27 
In the United States, the appellate courts have decided to 
follow the writ of error model, rather than the equity courts’ 
model.28  Indeed, although initially eight colonies in the United 
States adopted the more liberal appellate system, in which the 
appellate court could consider any legal or factual issue 
regardless of whether it was preserved, many of those colonies 
“replace[d] or combine[d]” their appellate systems with 
preservation requirements, such as writ of error or writ of 
certiorari.29  And, by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
American courts only allowed appeals for errors of law that 
could be found in the “written record of the case.”30 
The emphasis on procedure in early American criminal law 
can be traced to the significance of the adversarial system in 
American law, which was far more advanced than the 
adversarial system under English law.  For instance, as to 
whether defendants should receive the full assistance of 
defense counsel, American criminal law actually “preceded” 
England by guaranteeing that right by the 1780s, while 
England only accepted that concept by the mid-nineteenth 
century.31  America embraced the adversary system because it 
was consistent with the “new American” concepts of crime, 
 
26.  Id. 
27.  Martineau, supra note 13, at 1027. 
28.  Id. at 1027-28. 
29.  Bilder, supra note 14, at 914-915; see also 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND 
BEGINNINGS TO 1801 119-26 (2009); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE 
IN COLONIAL AMERICA 35-36 (1992); ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE 
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 23 
(1990).  
30.  Bilder, supra note 14, at 915; see generally POUND, supra note 21, at 
72-73, 80-81. 
31.  Randolph N. Jonakait, Symposium, The Rise of the American 
Adversary System: America Before England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327 
(2009) [hereinafter American Adversary System]; see also Randolph N. 
Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 95-96 (1995) [hereinafter Origins of the Confrontation 
Clause]. 
5
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checks and balances, and societal order.32  The appellate courts 
in the United States were criticized for focusing on procedure 
instead of justice.33  Consequently, American appellate system 
reforms between 1900 and World War II directed the appellate 
courts to examine the merits of a claim instead of procedural 
errors.34  For instance, in New York during this time period (as 
will be discussed in further depth, infra), the legislature 
broadened the review power of the appellate courts such that 
the intermediate appellate courts in New York could review 
issues of fact.35 
 
III. Preservation: What is it Good For? 
Preservation serves several important purposes, such as 
promoting efficiency, reducing gamesmanship, and reducing 
the caseload for appellate courts. Preservation encourages 
efficiency by requiring parties to raise objections as soon as 
possible at the trial level.36  After all, if a party objects to a 
court’s ruling, the party has given the trial court an 
opportunity to correct or explain its decision.37  And, if the trial 
court disagrees with the objecting party and makes an 
erroneous ruling, the appellate court benefits from a fully-
developed record.38 
Further, preservation discourages gamesmanship because 
it prevents a party from saving a critical argument until 
appeal.39  In other words, requiring preservation of an issue 
before it can be raised on appeal requires attorneys to fully 
litigate a case and create a record for appellate review.  Thus, a 
trial attorney cannot simply hope that, on appeal, an issue will 
be discovered that will undermine the trial verdict.40 
 
32.  Origins of the Confrontation Clause, supra note 31, at 108. 
33.  Martineau, supra note 13, at 1028. 
34.  Id. 
35.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(6) (1970). 
36.  Larry Cunningham, Appellate Review of Unpreserved Questions in 
Criminal Cases: An Attempt to Define the “Interest of Justice,” 11 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 293 (2010). 
37.  See generally Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Tr. Co., 322 A.2d 114, 116 
(Pa. 1973); see Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293. 
38.  Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293. 
39.  Id. at 285-86.  
40.  See generally Dilliplaine, 322 A.2d at 116. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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Appellate courts in the United States are overwhelmed 
with too many cases and not enough judges and staff to review 
them in a timely manner.41  The preservation requirement 
reduces the caseload for appellate courts because it limits the 
claims that appellate courts can review.42  Of course, any more 
time spent by an appellate court on a case delays the 
consideration of other cases by that court.43  Even more 
significantly, while an appellate court reviews an unpreserved 
claim, a litigant, who has raised a preserved meritorious claim, 
may be waiting for that same court to review his claim. 
Ultimately, requiring litigants to preserve their appellate 
claims ensures that appellate courts review the issues that 
litigants raised at trial and “about which there was some 
disagreement.”44  The preservation doctrine “thus encourages 
truth-seeking, the efficient resolution of the case, and the 
conservation of appellate resources.”45 
 
IV. New York’s Appellate Process 
New York’s appellate system has two-tiers: an 
intermediate appellate court, referred to as the Appellate 
Division, and the highest appellate court, the Court of 
Appeals.46  In New York, defendants in criminal cases have an 
 
41.  Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293; see generally Dione Christopher 
Greene, Note, The Federal Courts of Appeals, Unpublished Decisions, and the 
“No-Citation Rule,” 81 IND. L.J. 1503, 1505-07 (2006) (explaining five factors 
that contribute to the overburdening of federal courts of appeals: (1) caseload 
expansion caused by population growth; (2) “new statutory rights[;]” (3) 
“retention of diversity jurisdiction[;]” (4) crime; and (5) “miscellaneous 
factors” such as free legal services and more lawyers in general, and noting, 
in addition, that consequences include an expansion in judicial staff).  See 
also Developments and Practice Notes, Expedited Appeals in Selected State 
Appellate Courts, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 191 (2002) (detailing approaches 
used to combat the “caseload crisis” in appellate courts and characterizing 
crisis as equally significant in state and federal appellate courts).   
42.  See generally In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 360 
(3d Cir. 2010) (Weis, J., dissenting); see Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293.   
43.  Martineau, supra note 13, at 1032. 
44.  Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293; see Martineau, supra note 13, 
at 1029-30. 
45.  Cunningham, supra note 36, at 286; see also ARTHUR KARGER, THE 
POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 77 (Thompson/West 3d ed. rev. 
2005).  
46.  Cunningham, supra note 36, at 305. 
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“automatic right to an appeal” to the intermediate appellate 
courts.47  However, there is no automatic right to appeal to the 
Court of Appeals in criminal cases, except in death penalty 
cases.48  An appeal to the Court of Appeals is available by 
permission of a Judge of the Court of Appeals or a Justice of 
the Appellate Division.49 
There is another key difference between New York’s 
intermediate appellate courts and the Court of Appeals.  The 
intermediate appellate courts can review both issues of law and 
fact, and are permitted to set aside a conviction as “a matter of 
discretion in the interest of justice.”50  In contrast, the Court of 
Appeals cannot review factual questions or set aside a 
conviction by exercising its discretion; instead, the Court of 
Appeals can only review questions of law.51  The New York 
Court of Appeals is therefore a court of law.52 
It bears noting that New York allows defendants to raise 
certain post-conviction claims initially in a trial court; for 
instance, in New York, if a defendant believes his trial attorney 
did not provide him with meaningful representation, he can 
initiate post-conviction proceedings to set aside his conviction 
by filing a motion to a trial court.53  In a similar vein, if a 
defendant learns of newly discovered evidence that exonerates 
him, he can move to set aside his conviction via a post-
conviction proceeding.54 
 
V. New York’s Court of Law 
The Court of Appeals became a court of law because of “the 
clogged calendars and inordinate delays” that the Court had to 
deal with during its earlier periods when it did not have the 
same limitations as it does now.55  “From the time of its 
 
47.  Id. 
48.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 5. 
49.  Id. at 5-6.  
50.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(4)-(6) (1970); see also People v. 
Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1135 (N.Y. 1979); KARGER, supra note 45, at 5; 
Cunningham, supra note 36, at 305-06.  
51.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 704-05. 
52.  Id. 
53.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(f) (2015). 
54.  § 440.10(1)(g).  
55.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 4.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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inception in 1847 until comparatively recently, the history of 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals revolved around its 
struggle to cope with the demands of a volume of business 
exceeding its capacity.”56  In fact, at its inception, the Court of 
Appeals received a backlog of 1500 pending appeals from its 
predecessor, the Court for the Correction of Errors.57  
Legislation was enacted in 1848 to limit appeals to the Court of 
Appeals, but a series of subsequent amendments broadened the 
scope of the cases that the Court of Appeals could review.58  
Because the Court of Appeals scope of review was broadened, 
allowing it to review more cases, “the Court was gradually 
overwhelmed by the volume of appeals.”59 
Although New York’s Constitution of 1894 rigidly limited 
the Court to the review of questions of law, it created an 
exception for criminal capital cases.60  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, cases could pend for as long as four years 
before the Court of Appeals.61  By 1915, it took two years for a 
case to be resolved in the Court of Appeals.62  In 1917, many of 
the “jurisdictional limitations in effect today” were formulated 
and put into the Judiciary Article of the State Constitution that 
was adopted in 1925.63  Restrictions put in place at that time, 
as well as “subsequent amendments and statutory changes,” 
have allowed the Court of Appeals to reduce its backlog of 
cases.64  Indeed, during the early part of the twentieth century, 
the Court of Appeals applied the preservation doctrine strictly; 
for instance, in People v. Pindar,65 the Court of Appeals went as 
 
56.  Id. at 19. 
57.  Id. at 19-20. 
58.  Id. at 20.  “The finality requirement is a standard limitation on 
appealability imposed by many jurisdictions.  The doctrine, which is found in 
civil law, provides that “no appeal as of right or motion for leave to appeal in 
a civil matter may be entertained . . . unless the judgment or order sought to 
be appealed from is final determination.”  Id. at 33-34.  The concept of finality 
was added to the New York State Constitution in 1894, and subsequently 
codified in CPLR 5611.  Id. at 36-37.   
59.  Id. at 20. 
60.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 5. 
61.  Id. at 4. 
62.  Id.  
63.  Id.  
64.  Id.  
65.  People v. Pindar, 104 N.E. 133 (N.Y. 1914). 
9
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far as to state that defense counsel’s objections to a prosecutor’s 
summation did not preserve the claim for appeal because “[t]he 
law does not contemplate exceptions to the conduct of 
counsel . . . .”66 
By 1946, the Code of Criminal Procedure Law 420-a 
relaxed the state’s preservation rules.  Specifically, the statute 
noted that an 
 
exception shall be deemed to have been taken by 
the party adversely affected to every ruling 
either before or after the cause is finally 
submitted, when such party, at the time when 
the ruling is sought or made, makes known to 
the court or judge his position thereon by 
objection or otherwise.67 
 
In 1970, and subsequently in 1986, the preservation rule 
was amended to its current form.68  Currently, New York 
defines questions of law in criminal cases as those “preserved 
for appellate review by appropriate motion, objection or protest 
in the court of first instance.”69  Specifically, a question of law 
in criminal cases is “presented when a protest thereto was 
registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such 
ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court 
had an opportunity” to change its ruling.70  Such a protest has 
been sufficiently raised when the party made its position 
known to the court “with respect to a [particular] ruling or 
instruction,” or “if in response to a protest by a party, the court 
expressly decided the question raised on appeal.”71  For the 
most part, for an error “to present a question of law reviewable 
by the Court of Appeals . . . the claim . . . [must] have been 
preserved for appellate review by an appropriate motion, 
 
66.  Id. at 135. 
67.  N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 420-a (1946) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 470.05(2) (1986)). 
68.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05 (1986) (original version at ch. 
996, § 1 (1970)).  
69.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 704-05. 
70.  § 470.05(2). 
71.  Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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objection, protest or other action in the court of first 
instance.”72  Over the past 100 years in New York, the 
statutory definition of preservation has evolved from a hyper-
technical definition to a looser, more flexible definition. 
The modern Court of Appeals has made clear that an aim 
of New York’s preservation rule is to emphasize to the parties 
in a criminal proceeding their responsibility in “calling the 
attention of the court to errors of law which adversely affect a 
client [a]t a time when such errors are correctible.”73  Otherwise, 
the Court of Appeals has explained that, if the lawyers could 
“sit idly by” as an error was committed and claim that error on 
appeal, “the State’s fundamental interest in enforcing its 
criminal law could be frustrated by delay and waste of time 
and resources invited by a defendant.”74  Thus, in dealing with 
criminal cases, the Court of Appeals must balance achieving 
justice in criminal cases while, at the same time, not 
interpreting the rule of preservation or the Court’s power in 
such a way that yields inefficiency within the criminal justice 
system. 
 
VI. Loosening the Rules of Preservation in New 
York 
Since 2009, the clash between procedural rules and the 
appellate court’s obligation to do justice has become even more 
profound in New York.  A number of decisions from the Court 
of Appeals in the past few years indicates that the Court is 
seeking to loosen the rules of preservation, permitting it to 
address more cases.  Indeed, one judge on the Court of Appeals 
even went so far as to state that preservation is a mere 
technicality invoked by prosecutors who have a “well-
established tendency to pounce on every arguable imperfection 
in a defense lawyer’s argument as a barrier to deciding a case 
on the merits.”75  In such cases, some judges urge that the 
“specific objection requirement” of New York’s preservation 
 
72.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 746. 
73.  People v. Robinson, 326 N.E.2d 784, 789 (N.Y. 1975) (emphasis 
added). 
74.  People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976). 
75.  People v. Beasley, 946 N.E.2d 166, 169 (N.Y. 2011) (Smith, J., 
concurring).  
11
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doctrine need “not be applied in the overly technical way . . . .”76 
Recently, in People v. Finch, the Court dealt with a 
defendant who had been arrested on three separate dates 
within one month, and had successfully appealed to the Court 
of Appeals his conviction stemming from his third arrest.77  The 
majority of the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had 
preserved an argument for appellate review, even though he 
made that argument to a judge during his second arrest before 
even committing the crime that was the subject of the appeal.78 
Two judges dissented in Finch.  Judge Abdus-Salaam 
pointed out that the majority’s interpretation of the 
preservation rule was inconsistent with its previous 
interpretations of the preservation rule, since the majority 
appeared to find that defendant had made an objection, despite 
the fact that he had yet to even commit the disputed crime.79  
Indeed, Judge Abdus-Salaam pointed out that the case 
illustrated one of the “primary rationales for the preservation 
doctrine, namely the complete development of the defendant’s 
claim and the swift determination of guilt or non-guilt,” which 
“would be undermined were appellate review permitted under 
such circumstances.”80  Since the defendant did not make his 
objection during the proceedings arising from his third arrest, 
the trial court was “deprived of the opportunity to ‘advanc[e] 
both the truth-seeking purpose of the trial and the goal of swift 
and final determination of guilt or nonguilt of . . . defendant.’”81  
Judge Read also dissented, writing that she hoped that the 
majority’s interpretation of the preservation doctrine was an 
“adventure in result-oriented decision making,” which “will be 
looked upon in retrospect as an aberration, not a harbinger.”82 
In People v. Albergotti, the Court of Appeals found that a 
claim had been preserved by the defense attorney even though 
the “defendant did not specifically complain to the court” about 
 
76.  People v. Chestnut, 973 N.E.2d 697, 700 n.2 (N.Y. 2010).  
77.  People v. Finch, 15 N.E.3d 307, 308-09 (N.Y. 2014). 
78.  Id. at 310-11.  
79.  Id. at 314-15 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).  
80.  Id. at 320.  
81.  Id. (citing People v. Hawkins, 900 N.E.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. 2008)).  
82.  Id. at 328 (Read, J., dissenting).  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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the grievance that he was arguing at the Court of Appeals.83  
Similarly, in People v. Chestnut, the Court of Appeals found a 
defense argument preserved even though, as the dissent 
pointed out, the defense’s argument to the trial court was based 
on a different ground than what it argued on appeal.84 
Still, further evidence indicates that the Court of Appeals 
has increasingly abandoned procedural restrictions to review 
the merits of more criminal cases.  As noted, in New York, for a 
defendant to claim that his attorney was ineffective at trial, he 
generally has to file a post-conviction motion pursuant to CPL 
440.10 to a trial court to expand the record so that the trial 
court can make findings of fact as to whether the trial attorney 
was ineffective.85  However, where it is apparent from the 
record that a trial attorney has been ineffective, such a post-
conviction motion is not required for an appellate court to 
determine whether an attorney was ineffective at trial.86  From 
2009 to 2014, the Court of Appeals dispensed with the CPL 
440.10 requirement four times in reversing convictions.87  From 
1999 until 2008, the Court of Appeals dispensed with that 
requirement only twice.88 
 
VII. Consequences of Loosening Preservation 
Rules 
As noted, a critical argument in favor of the preservation 
rule is that it promotes efficiency in the appellate system.  
Indeed, as discussed earlier, in the nineteenth century, the 
Court of Appeals had a significant backlog of cases.89  To help 
reduce the backlog, restrictions were imposed on what the 
Court of Appeals could review.90  Further restrictions were 
imposed by 1925, such as the enactment of a preservation rule, 
 
83.  People v. Albergotti, 952 N.E.2d 1010, 1010 (N.Y. 2011).   
84.  Chestnut, 973 N.E.2d at 702-03 (Read, J., dissenting). 
85.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (2012). 
86.  See People v. Satterfield, 488 N.E.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. 1985).  
87.  See People v. Clermont, 999 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2013); People v. 
Oathout, 989 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 2013); People v. Nesbitt, 988 N.E.2d 478 (N.Y. 
2013); People v. Fisher, 967 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 2012).  
88.  People v. Lewis, 809 N.E.2d 1106 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Berroa, 782 
N.E.2d 1148 (N.Y. 2002).  
89.  KARGER, supra note 45, at 20.  
90.  Id. at 4. 
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since around that time, the Court of Appeals had a two-year 
backlog of cases.91 
Unsurprisingly, as the Court of Appeals has loosened its 
interpretation of the preservation rule, the Court has had to 
deal with a larger caseload, has taken longer to decide cases, 
and has issued more decisions.  To be sure, it is possible that in 
the vast majority of cases that the Court of Appeals has 
recently reviewed, there is a clear question of law.  But, as the 
history of the Court of Appeals has shown, whenever the rules 
of preservation are relaxed or not strictly enforced, the number 
of cases that the court deals with sharply increases. 
 As discussed earlier, prior to the twentieth century, when 
the Court did not have a strict preservation doctrine, it had an 
unmanageable caseload and took as long as four years to 
resolve cases.92  By 1915, the Court of Appeals had a two-year 
lag time, and as a result, in 1917, the legislature took action 
and crafted a strict preservation law to limit the number of 
criminal cases that the Court of Appeals could review.93  Thus, 
the Court should be cautious as to how it interprets the 
preservation doctrine to avoid repeating the inefficiencies of 
the past. 
Indeed, over the past six years, the Court of Appeals has 
dealt with a dramatic increase in the number of criminal cases 
that it deals with, and it takes appreciably longer to decide 
them.  This is especially clear when comparing the period of 
time from 1998-2003 to 2009-2014. 
 
 Year Average number 






199894 220 82 74 
199995 230 63 62 
200096 217 68 68 
200197 193 68 42 
 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 4. 
93.  Id.  
94.  1998 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § A(1)-(3).  
95.  1999 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3). 
96.  2000 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
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200298 229 60 67 
200399 259 55 46 
 
Between 1998 and 2003, the Court of Appeals, on average, 
took about 225 days from the filing of a case before deciding 
it.100  In that same period, an average of sixty-six cases were 
submitted to the Court, and on average, about sixty cases were 
decided by the Court.101 
The six-year period from 2009 to 2014 stands in stark 
contrast to the previous six-year period between 1998 and 
2003: 
 








2009102 275 102 66 
2010103 317 120 99 
2011104 375 87 112 
2012105 368 105 91 
2013106 375 89 111 
2014107 403 91 91 
 
During the period from 2009 to 2014, 352 days on average 
would pass from the date a case was filed until the Court of 
Appeals decided the case, a difference of 127 days more than 
from the period from 1998 to 2003.108  From 2009 to 2014, an 
average of ninety-nine cases were filed in the Court of Appeals 
 
97.  2001 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3). 
98.  2002 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3) 
99.  2003 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3). 
100.  See supra notes 87-92.  
101.  Id.  
102.  2009 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2). 
103.  2010 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2). 
104.  2011 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2). 
105.  2012 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(1)(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2). 
106.  2013 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2). 
107.  2014 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and (I)(B)(1)-(2) 
108.  See supra notes 87-92, 95-107. 
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each year, an increase of 50 percent from the 1998 to 2003 
period.109  And, from 2009 to 2014, an average of ninety-five 
criminal cases were decided each year, an increase of 58 
percent from the period from 1998 to 2003.110 
 
Conclusion 
The New York Court of Appeals’ experience demonstrates 
how difficult it is to place procedural rules on a court handling 
a criminal matter.  Indeed, as this paper illustrates, the New 
York Court of Appeals, like many other appellate courts that 
deal with criminal cases, is still struggling to balance justice 
with efficiency. 
In New York, the legislature has made clear that it wants 
the Court of Appeals to be a court of law and has placed 
procedural constraints on the legal issues it can review in 
criminal cases, such as permitting it to review preserved 
claims.111  However, the legislature’s directive to review only 
preserved issues of law is at odds with Court of Appeals’ 
decisions in which it corrects errors that are not preserved.  
Indeed, pure error correction, in the absence of preservation, is 
the power of the Appellate Division. 
Consequently, to circumvent the statutory preservation 
doctrine in New York, the Court of Appeals has relaxed its 
interpretation of the rule of preservation so that it can decide 
the merits of certain cases.  Unsurprisingly, the cost of relaxing 
the preservation doctrine in New York has been that the Court 
of Appeals now has a heavier caseload and takes longer to 
decide cases.  Not only is the Court less efficient in resolving 
cases, but those individuals whose attorneys fully litigated a 
claim, which was incorrectly decided by a judge, have to wait 
longer to achieve a just result in their cases.  As a result, the 
New York criminal justice system is not as efficient it could be. 
 
 
109.  Id.  
110.  Id.  
111. KARGER, supra note 45, at 746; see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 470.05(2) 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5
